Saturday 21 May 2016

Noble City






Nagorno Karabakh:

 Russia's Proxy War

In the Caucasus



Alexander Petersen






30 December 2013





Nagorno Karabakh: The mountainous territory is an internationally recognized part of Azerbaijan, but has a majority ethnic-Armenian population.[1]

This is especially the case after Armenian regular forces and militias, with their Russian supporters, cleansed the Karabakh territory and its seven surrounding Azerbaijani districts of ethnic Azeris during the most violent phase of the conflict in the early 1990s.[1]

The conflict zone remains one of the most ominous powder-kegs in the world because even though a cease-fire was signed in 1994, firefights, sniping, and incursions occur regularly along the trench warfare-style line of contact between the two belligerent parties.[1]

The initial phase of the conflict resulted in over a million refugees and thus remains a neuralgic issue for the peoples of both countries. With no international peacekeepers in the conflict zone and a very limited number of observers, just one miscalculation could reignite a full-scale war.[1]

So, how is this a proxy war? Russian assistance is the main reason for Armenian control over Karabkh and its surrounding regions. [1]

This comes in the form of a treaty guaranteeing Russian defense of Armenia in case of conflict, which is compounded by a number of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) obligations that tie the two countries together, primarily ensuring that Russia could work closely with, and even command, Armenian regular forces.[1]

On the ground, this is underpinned by Russia’s major military base at Gyumri. The 102nd Military Base, leftover from Soviet times, keeps 5,000 troops armed with tanks, artillery, helicopters, MiG-29 aircraft and Iskender-M tactical ballistic missiles ready to support Armenian forces and to serve as a deterrent against any Azerbaijani plan to retake the territory.[1]

Armenian forces receive training at the Russian base and the militaries of the two countries conduct regular exercises together. Russian officers inspect Armenian positions and provide tactical advice. In October 2013, Col. [1]

Andrey Ruzinsky, commander of the Gyumri base, stated in an interview with an official Russian media outlet that Russian forces are prepared to intervene should the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict heat up again. [1]

In a show of how important the base is to Russia, when Vladimir Putin visited Armenia recently, he spent more time at Gyumri than in Yerevan, Armenia’s capital. He also declared that Russia will increase its influence in the South Caucasus this year.[1]

Armenia’s defense arsenal is procured from Russia, and Moscow provides major discounts forthe dependent nation. [1]

These arms go both to Armenian regular forces and the militias active in the conflict zone. Additionally, Armenia’s economy is almost entirely dependent on Russian investment, and all large enterprises in the country are controlled by Russian firms with ties to the Kremlin.[1]

More than 80% of Armenia’s energy infrastructure is owned by Russian companies and the government owes Russia enormous debts, incurred from natural gas and arms sales. [1]

Remittances from abroad are crucial to Armenia’s economic welfare, and a major portion of these comes from Armenians working in Russia. [1]

Given Moscow’s proclivity to deport foreign nationals for geopolitical reasons (as occurred with Georgians during the 2008 war), the fate of Armenian workers in Russia is a major source of leverage.[1]

Interestingly, Russia also sells arms to Azerbaijan and maintains cordial relations with Baku. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfer database, Russia sold Azerbaijan $1 billion dollars’ worth of weapons from 2007 to 2012, with another major sale this year. [1]

This is a telltale sign of the interesting balance that Moscow seeks to maintain in this conflict.[1]

By simmering along in a violent, but tolerable (for Russia) state, creating a gaping chasm of instability in the middle of the South Caucasus, Russia achieves a number of strategic aims without direct intervention: it pressures Western-oriented and energy-rich Azerbaijan, ensuring that despite its growing independence of policy, Russia holds a hammer above its head; and it provides an important ace up Russia’s sleeve to menace European energy and transport projects, mostly oil and gas pipelines that snake from the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey to the EU.[1]

The simmering conflict serves the same purpose when it comes to U.S. and NATO supply lines – the so-called Northern Distribution Network (NDN) – to and from Afghanistan, and will continue to block Western plans for a “New Silk Road” through the region to bolster Afghanistan’s economy.[1]

It is a potential geopolitical grenade to throw if greater instability suits Russia in the region, and the conflict provides a ready excuse for greater Russian military and diplomatic involvement should the international community seek greater security in the region.[1]

Most of all, constant fighting keeps Armenia in a stranglehold. It ensured that Yerevan recently joined Moscow’s neo-Soviet Customs Union, that Armenia maintains a subordinate membership within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and that Armenia does not integrate further into the EU and NATO. [1]

This was evidenced most dramatically by Armenia’s rejection of building greater ties with Europe before the November 2013 Vilnius Summit of the EU’s Eastern Partnership.[1]

Russia also holds the key to conflict settlement. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe maintains a conflict negotiation mechanism, the Minsk Group, which is meant to facilitate discussions between the belligerent sides and oversee the implementation of a peace agreement.[1]

The international co-chairs of this group, however, are the United States, France, and Russia, meaning that a party to the conflict and the major geopolitical impetus behind it is also officially recognized as a mediator.[1]

It is perhaps not surprising that the Minsk Group has achieved little in almost two decades.[1]

For Russia, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a low-cost, low-effort proxy war yielding geopolitical returns.[1]

The conflict helps Russia to indirectly pressure Azerbaijan, the EU, NATO, and the United States, as well as to maintain a hand in the economies and major infrastructure projects of the region.[1]

Russia’s security commitments to Armenia and capabilities in the region mean that Moscow may have to make good on its commitments at some point in the future, but for the moment, as the region suffers continuing instability, Russia gains continued clout amongst its neighbors.[1]

Most of all, Moscow holds the power to put a cork in the strategic bottleneck of the Caucasus between Russia and Iran, blocking Western access to Central Asia and Afghanistan.[1]

What, if anything, can the United States and its allies do to ameliorate this dilemma? As Minsk Group co-chairs, the U.S. and France (representing the EU) can cease to play the polite diplomatic game that requires treating Russia as if it were an impartial mediator.[1]

A public acknowledgment of Russia’s active role as a party to the conflict would not only clarify various interests involved, but also expose Moscow on the international stage in such a way as to potentially elicit a shift in its posture.[1]

Were U.S. and European diplomats to publicly call out Russia on Nagorno-Karabakh, it may begin to tip the Kremlin’s cost-benefit calculus.[1]

This should go hand-in-hand with a renewed effort towards holding comprehensive negotiations. The Obama administration is in fact very well suited to tackle the thorny Karabakh conflict.[1]

The current U.S. co-chair of the Minsk Group, Ambassador James Warlick, is one of the most senior diplomats to hold the position, and he brings extensive experience negotiating with Afghan leaders on security agreements. [1]

Secretary of State John Kerry is intimately familiar with the ins and outs of the conflict, having as a Massachusetts senator represented one of the most powerful Armenian diaspora communities.[1]

In his current role – as ought to be expected – he has shown that he can leave his legislative biases behind. But, importantly, he still holds the trust of Armenians: a crucial element to achieving a settlement.[1]

In the context of matters with Iran, Syria, the East China Sea, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it would seem that Nagorno-Karabakh might not warrant high-level U.S. and/or European attention.[1]

However, as Western forces withdraw from Afghanistan, cease moving supplies through the NDN and generally begin a strategic retreat from the former Soviet space, Washington and Brussels will quickly be left without a strategy for engaging Eurasia.[1]

Vladimir Putin’s recent pugnacity in Ukraine and plans for a Eurasian Union are engendered, at least in part, by the perception of Western abandonment of the region. [1]

By grasping the nettle of the Karabakh conflict, Western powers can begin to reformulate their Eurasia policy, from one in which the region is simply a thoroughfare to Afghanistan, to one of understanding the region as warranting strategic attention for its own sake.[1]


Dr. Alexandros Petersen is the author of The World Island: Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West and co-edits www.chinaincentralasia.com.[1]


The Armenia-Iran Relationship



Strategic Implication for Security

In the South Caucasus Region



Claude Moniquet & William Racimora




January 17th, 2013



In Tehran view, the special relationship with Armenia offers a way to evade international sanctions and pursue its nuclear ambitions. [2]

It is aimed at struggling against largely imagined Azeri “irredentism” and at weakening Azerbaijan as part of the competition for Caspian Sea’s hydrocarbon resources. [2]


Taking a position into the Caucasus lastly allows Iran to oppose the involvement of the United States and of the European Union in the region and to respond the strategic ambitions of its traditional foes: Turkey and Israel.[2]

More generally, Armenia Iran and Russia seem to have agreed to prevent the United States and its ally to build a strong presence in the region, with the risk of preventing a possible achievement of the Nagorno-Karabakh’s “package solution” proposed by the OSCE.[3][4]

An important section of the plan indeed provides the deployment of a peace-keeping force which could include Western troops. Iran strictly opposes such deployment, considering it would pose a serious threat to its national security given its tense relations with Washington.[3][4]


Iran’s energy deliveries to Armenia allowed Yerevan to circumvent the Azerbaijani and Turkish sanctions policy carried out through closing the borders. Moreover, it has reduced Armenia’s reliance on Russia, while helping Iranian gas to get to Europe. The two countries have therefore invested millions of dollars in energy projects, making sure that Armenia won’t be hit by and energy shortage during in diplomatic crisis, hence undermining Baku and Ankara in the peace process negotiations.[2]

In exchange, Armenia is providing electric energy produced by hydroelectric power plants, thereby breaking the international embargo that has been imposed on the Islamic Republic.[2]

As we will discuss later in this report, Armenia has become an important partner for Iran’s diplomacy in the region to improve its economic links and to hinder Turkish and American influence in South Caucasus.[5][6][2]

The two countries, perceiving themselves besieged in their neighbourhoods, fostered cooperation establishing a border corridor, reducing and then eliminating transnational movement constraints like visas or trade permits. [7][8][2]

According to the head of the Armenia-Iran Chamber of Commerce (another product of this cooperation), in 2010 bilateral trade was at $310 million, up 50 percent from the previous year.[7][8][2]

818 companies had Iranian capital in Armenia, Russia in the same year had 1,000 companies operating in the country35 . The two countries cooperate not only in gas and electricity but also in area like hard-industry, pharmaceuticals, mining and petrochemicals.[7][8][2]



Stratfor




March 9, 2016



For much of the post-Soviet period, Russia has been the strongest external power in the Caucasus. In defeating Georgia in the August 2008 war, Russia was able to build up its military presence in the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.[9]

Moscow was also able to expose the West's unwillingness to intervene on behalf of an EU and NATO ally.[9]

Russia keeps an additional 5,000 troops in Armenia, and while there is no military presence in Azerbaijan, forces loyal to Moscow surround the country to the north and west, forcing Baku to keep Moscow's strategic interests in mind during any decision-making.[9]

In the Caucasus, the change in Russia's ability to project influence has been very clear. [9]

' Georgia has substantially increased its integration with the West in the two years since the EuroMaidan uprising, signing an association and free trade agreement with the European Union in 2014 and opening a NATO training center in the country in August 2015.[9]

Additionally, Georgia purchased air defense systems from France, a notable sale because Tbilisi had been under a virtual arms embargo from the West since 2008. Though EU and NATO membership has remained elusive for Georgia, the West's support and commitment to the country has indisputably grown since the Ukrainian uprising.[9]





The Caucasus:

The next battleground
For Russia & Turkey?



SELİN NASİ



February/29/2016




Armenia has long enjoyed deep military ties with Russia, but the recent military buildup is perceived as an expansion of Russian dominance in the region - at a time of much talk about a new Cold War, particularly with regard to Crimea and Ukraine. [10]

As for Turkey, the political setting has dramatically changed since its downing of a Russian jet in November 2015. For the Kremlin taking revenge, demarcating its sphere of influence along the Turkish border, and pressuring Turkey over “fraternal” Azerbaijan, all make perfect sense in this context. [10]

Not unsurprisingly, Nagorno-Karabakh has returned to the agenda of both countries in parallel to the tension over the downed jet.[10]


Azerbaijan:
'Khojaly Witness of a War Crime
- Armenia in the Dock'



Russia’s recent deployment to Armenia is likely to change the balance in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in favor of Armenia. However, the devil is in the details. The Erebuni base near Gyumri is just 10 kilometers from the Turkish border, and reports say patrol flights are about to start soon along the Armenian border with Turkey.[10]



Part 13. Yegana Salman




Against this tense geopolitical backdrop, it would only take a spark to turn the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict into a new proxy war between Russia and the West. Richard Giragosian , director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC) in Yerevan, said a resumption of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan could escalate to a wider geopolitical conflict. [10]



Russian Colonialism |
Stuff That I Find Interesting




“Any return to war over Karabakh threatens to involve much larger regional powers, including Turkey, Russia and Iran. There is also a narrower but equally significant danger that a resumption of hostilities may directly endanger the region’s network of energy pipelines,” Giragosian said.[10]

In the event of an outbreak of war, Giragosian suggests that not only would planned pipelines and energy projects such as the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) project be at severe risk, but existing pipelines such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline would become vulnerable to attacks by Armenian forces.[10]





Dopamine:
Politics, Religion & Power






Aging

As War

Between

Chemical & Biochemical Processes:

Protein Methylation

And The Recognition

of

Age-Damaged

Proteins For Repair


The neurochemistry of power has implications for political change.The primary neurochemical involved in the reward of power that is known today is dopamine, the same chemical transmitter responsible for producing a sense of pleasure.[12]

The Neurochemical Self and its Anomalies. (NIKOLAS ROSE)Where Foucault analysed biopolitics, we now must analyse bioeconomics, for human capital is now to be understood in a rather literal sense, in terms of the new linkages between the politics and economics of life itself.[13]



Steven Clarke

2003




It is clear that almost all measures of physiological function decline in human aging. How can we decipher the molecular basis of this loss of functional capacity with age? [11]

Genetics may play a role in programming gene expression for declining function with age. However, a fundamental part of aging may be simply reflected by unwanted chemical processes resulting in the spontaneous appearance of side products of normal metabolism—the formation of mutated, less active, and potentially toxic species of DNA, RNA, proteins, lipids, and small molecules.[11]

To the extent that organisms can minimize the accumulation of these altered biomolecules, they can endure. In a sense then, aging may be seen as a battle between biochemistry and chemistry.[11]

Organisms have evolved biochemical systems where just the right DNA sequences encode just the right sequences of RNA and protein, which fold in just the right way to make both catalysts and architectural structures.[11]

The catalysts combine speed and specificity to ensure that thermodynamically favorable but kinetically unfavorable reactions occur that lead to metabolic pathways for energy generation, biosynthesis, and signal transduction.[11]



The Russians Are Coming:
Georgia's Creeping Occupation




Since there are a number of possible chemical reactions with each metabolic intermediate, the provisions of enzymes that catalyze just one of the possible reactions can lead to a rapid and smooth metabolic conversion of reactants to products with few side products .[11]

All of this represents the beauty of biochemistry in making life possible. Why should not such life last forever? [11]

What works against the beauty of biochemistry is chemistry itself. While enzymes can speed up reactions, it is more difficult to slow down reactions.[11]

Side reactions still go on, and the more time that elapses, the more unwanted side products are formed. Importantly, these side products are not just small molecules, but all types of biomolecules including nucleic acids and proteins. [11]

Almost all of the molecules that make up living systems, from small metabolites to proteins, are not thermodynamically stable (carbon dioxide and water may be the exceptions).[11]

Thus, from the moment that biomolecules are synthesized they begin the process of being slowly but surely converted non-enzymatically to decomposition products. [11]

These spontaneous chemical reactions (or side reactions) over time thus result in the modification of the biochemical species required for the orderly processes of life described above into less functional species.[11]

Perhaps the clearest example of this is the decomposition of DNA, including photochemical alterations, the hydrolytic loss of bases, and oxidative modifications, all of which lead to altered structures and mutation.[11]

To combat this, the genome encodes an army of DNA repair enzymes that can efficiently reverse the effects of the spontaneous degradation reactions (Gilchrest and Bohr, 2001).[11]



Neurochemical Analysis of the U.S.
Presidential Candidates




Azerbaijan:

A New Course for Armenian Diplomacy

 After the Four-Day War


Gholshan Pashayeva: Trapped Between War and Peace: The Case of Karabakh.[15]

The leadership of this breakaway territory continues to integrate the region into Armenia as much as possible.[16]

 No statements to the contrary can alter the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh economically and politically depends heavily on Armenia. and the Armenian Diaspora around the world.[16]



Eurasia Net Org



June 15, 2016





In early May, the government of Armenia started a diplomatic game by using “recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh,” a separatist Azerbaijani region under Armenian occupation, as leverage against Azerbaijan in peace talks over the region and seven adjoining occupied territories.[14]

A draft bill to recognize “the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” emerged in Armenia after the so-called “Four-Day War,” intensified skirmishes between Azerbaijani and Armenian military forces in the Karabakh conflict zone that ran from April 2-6.[14]

On May 5, the Armenian cabinet approved the draft, proposed by two opposition members of parliament, the Heritage Party’s Zaruhi Postanjian and the Armenian National Congress faction’s Hrant Bagratian. [14]

Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharian said that the approval “is linked to the results of the discussion between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, taking into account further developments” in the territory, Armenian media reported.[14]

Azerbaijan condemned Armenia’s initiative as an attempt to halt negotiations over Karabakh and seven adjoining territories also under Armenian occupation.[14]

Russia and the United States, both co-chairs of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, which oversees the peace talks, clearly expressed displeasure at any recognition of Karabakh.[14]

Russian presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov cautioned “both sides” against “any steps that could violate the fragile ceasefire and lead to an escalation in Karabakh.”[14]

Urging further negotiations, Deputy US State Department spokesperson Mark Toner noted that neither the United States nor the international community recognizes Karabakh’s independence from Azerbaijan. The region’s “final status will only be resolved in the context of a comprehensive settlement,” he said.[14]

Amid international disapproval of its plans, the Armenian government then backtracked. It claimed that it had not approved recognition of Karabakh’s independence, but only made a conclusion about the two MPs’ legislative initiative.[14]





Albert Agarunov was born in a Baku suburb to Mountain Jewish parents
25 April 1969 – 7 May 1992
Albert Agarunovich Agarunov (Azerbaijani: Albert Aqarunov) (25 April 1969 – 7 May 1992) was a Starshina of the Azerbaijani Army who died during the Nagorno-Karabakh War. He was among the last Azerbaijanis to defend Shusha[citation needed], which was occupied by Armenian forces on May 9, 1992.[23]
He served in the Soviet Army from 1987 to 1989. In 1991, he voluntarily enlisted in the Azerbaijani Army in the war against Armenia Azerbaijan's over Nagorno-Karabakh region. According to Azerbaijani sources, on December 8, 1991, Agarunov along with driver Agababa Huseynov managed to disable nine Armenian tanks and two armoured trucks.[24]
Courtesy of Wikipedia
  Time of Israel, May 8, 2015:


Albert Agarunov , A Jewish Warrior in a Muslim Land"


Rabbi Israel Barouk,



Albert’s parents emigrated to the capital city Baku, from a small community known as the Red Town – one of the oldest Jewish regions in the world. Baku offered many opportunities, and the Agarunov family raised all 10 into strong, intelligent, and especially happy young men and women. Albert was an engineer, and those who knew him remember a spirited and especially clever man and true friend; a person who lived his life without fear. This past April 25, 2015, Albert would have celebrated his 46th birthday.[25]
Rabbi Israel Barouk: The life of Albert Agarunov is one that carries spiritual and emotional resonance for all people, but especially for Jews in the Muslim world. The meaning and depth of his identity was only realized because he was born and raised in a place that has spent thousands of years living as if interreligious harmony is an expected component of life. Albert fought for his homeland Azerbaijan, because for thousands of years and all the right reasons, his homeland has fought for him.[25]
Rabbi Israel Barouk: "Albert was known to all who knew him as a shining example of strength and kindness. He was one of the Armenian army’s biggest targets. The Armenian invaders were so especially offended by Albert’s strong military skills, coupled with his identity as a Jew, that they placed a bounty of what equals 5 million rubles on his head. Albert fought with all of his heart and might as he and many Jewish soldiers faced the Armenian invasion and subsequent acts of ethnic cleansing and brutality against over 20 percent of Azerbaijan." [25]




ALBERT AQARUNOV -
A Jewish Warrior
in a Muslim Land




Ex-Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian, who governed Armenia during the active stage of the Nagorno-Karabakh fighting in the 1990s, shared that disapproval.[14]

“Without the support of international organizations or at least one or two superpowers,” he announced on May 6, recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence from Azerbaijan “can lead to unpredictable consequences.”[14]

That stance hearkened back to 1997, when, in the article “War or Peace? Time to Get More Serious,” Ter-Petrosian highlighted the importance of making concessions to resolve the conflict.[14]

“Let us not indulge in self-deception and cherish false illusions,” he wrote. “We have no allies on the issue of Karabakh’s independence.”[14]

His emphasis on concessions came shortly after the American, French and Russian co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group proposed a new peace plan that envisaged a step-by-step approach to a long-term settlement.[14]

The plan would have delayed agreement on Karabakh’s status until the last phase of the peace process, which would start with the return of the Armenian-occupied Azerbaijani territories surrounding Karabakh to Azerbaijan’s control. [14]

This could create a favorable environment for a mutually acceptable deal on the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh.[14]

Azerbaijan and Ter-Petrosian accepted this approach, but it was rejected by the powerful members of Ter-Petrosian’s government, including the then-minister of national security, Serzh Sargsyan, now Armenia’s president. Amid an outcry from the opposition and the start of a public campaign denouncing Ter-Petrosian for planning to “sell out” Karabakh, the president resigned in 1998.[14]


PACE SUMMER SESSION




The “party of peace,” he announced, had been defeated.[14]

Flash forward to the present, and all has changed. Despite deep differences between Ter-Petrosian, now the head of the opposition Armenian National Congress, and President Sargsyan, the old foes recently became friends.[14]

Their meeting after the April flare-up in the conflict zone was followed by Ter-Petrosian’s visit to Karabakh, where he met with the region’s separatist leaders.[14]

The former president subsequently switched tactics and called for Armenian diplomats to use the principle of “remedial secession” – the tenet that oppressed people have the right to claim secession in response to threats.[14]

Ter-Petrosian, however, forgot about the rights of Karabakh’s Azeri residents, who were subjected to ethnic cleansing, along with hundreds of thousands of others from the seven adjacent occupied territories. This community of displaced Azerbaijanis numbers about 1 million.[14]

He also neglected to mention ethnic Armenian military forces’ 1992 massacre of ethnic Azerbaijani civilians at Khojaly town. At that time, Ter-Petrosian was president of Armenia and Serzh Sargsyan was the head of Karabakh’s separatist forces.[14]

Vladimir  V.  Putin


Is Listening 


TO


An Original Song


FROM 


Karabakh of Azerbaijan




Song In Azeri



İlham əliyev və Putin




 Qarabağ Şikəstəsini dinləyir





For years, Ter-Petrosian and Sargsyan were perceived as implacable foes, particularly after the 2008 presidential elections, which ended with fatal clashes between Ter-Petrosian’s supporters and government forces. At the time, Ter-Petrosian characterized Sargsyan’s rule as “a catastrophe for Armenia.”[14]

Sargsyan’s government wants to use Ter-Petrosian to show its domestic audience the importance of national solidarity against external threats. That solidarity, in turn, is key to distracting attention from the country’s worsening economic and social-welfare situation.[14]

Ultimately, Ter-Petrosian’s U-turn from the “party of peace” to the “party of war” is an attempt by the Armenian political elite to block the peace process and preserve the status quo indefinitely, or until conditions favor Armenia.

This new course of Armenian diplomacy, however, could draw matters to fresh conflict.[14]

As Ter-Petrosian wrote in his 1997 proposal to the people of Armenia, “The issue should be solved only through peaceful negotiations; preserving the status quo for a long time is not possible, because neither the international community nor the economic capabilities of Armenia will allow that. Karabakh and Armenia will not benefit from the unsettled situation, as it impedes their economic development.”[14]

This approach appears timely now as well. A comprehensive resolution of the conflict can be achieved only through fair and effective peace talks based on international norms. [14]

Editor's note: Nurlan Aliyev is an adviser in the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. [14]


THE NAGORNO KARABAKH CONFLICT

IN THE AFTERMATH

 OF

 THE RUSSIA-GEORGIA WAR



Armenian Forces

Seized Close To

 One-Fifth


of

Azerbaijan’s Territory




Gholshan Pashayeva





 The Symposium

Entitled :

“Reassessing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

 in the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia war”


 The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,

Tufts University


 

26-27 September 2009




Dr. Golshan Pashayeva

Courtesy of Karabakh Org




Armenian forces seized close to one-fifth of Azerbaijan’s territory, including all of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven other adjacent Azerbaijani districts located outside the autonomous region (Lachin, Kelbajar, Fizuli, Jebrail, Zangelan, Aghdam and Gubadli). One region of the country and its surrounding adjacent districts is currently outside government control.[16]

The occupied territories have been transformed into a buffer zone considered by Armenians as a bargaining chip on the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh and a security guarantee against Azerbaijan. Armenia is trying to use the current status quo as an instrument of political pressure to impose finally a fait-accompli-based solution.[16]





Посол Азербайджана в России
Полад Бюльбюльоглу в Интервью TV
Пpo Карабах




The leadership of this breakaway territory continues to integrate the region into Armenia as much as possible. No statements to the contrary can alter the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh economically and politically depends heavily on Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora around the world.[16]

Some estimates put the number of deaths on both sides at about 30,000; a huge number of refugees and internally displaced persons have created a devastating humanitarian crisis that has lasted for more than 20 years.[16]

Sources, including Armenian ones, report that tens of thousands of settlers have moved to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, including districts adjacent to the Nagorno-Karabakh region, including Lachin, Kalbajar, Zangilan and Jabrayil in an organized manner with the purpose of annexing these territories.[17]

In 1993, the UN Security Council adopted four resolutions (822, 853, 874, 884) that were directly related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The resolutions stressed the need for immediate cessation of military activities and hostile acts, immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of occupying forces from all occupied regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan.[16]

Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1992 bans American government aid of any kind (including humanitarian) to be given to the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan. However, due to Azerbaijani support provided to the U.S. in its efforts to counter international terrorism, section 907 was amended which resulted in a Presidential waiver authority which has been exercised annually starting from 2002.[16]

In December 2005, the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe (PACE) adopted resolution 1416 entitled “The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Group” reaffirming the occupation of a considerable part of the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan. [16]

PACE made it clear that the occupation of foreign territory by a member state constitutes a grave violation of that state’s obligations as a member of the Council of Europe and urged the parties concerned to comply with the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council, in particular by withdrawing military forces from any occupied territories.[16]

In March 2008, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution concerning “the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan” reaffirming the territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan and demanding withdrawal of all Armenian forces. The resolution calls for the return of the population of the occupied territories, and recognizes the need to provide secure and equal living conditions for Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.[16]

There are no diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan or Armenia and Turkey.[16]

Before proceeding with an analysis of the implications of the Russia-Georgia war for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it should be noted that the South Caucasus has been considered a Russian sphere of influence for almost 200 years.[16]

Since 1991 it has become a region of global interest due to its key geo-strategic and geo-economic parameters, when three new independent states appeared in this territory.[16]

However, due to divergent foreign policies pursued by the leaders these countries, the South Caucasus has been gradually polarized.[16]

This five-day long (8-12 August 2008) war proved that Russia still considers the South Caucasus as the zone of its vital and strategic historical interest and perhaps is ready to fight against the establishment of any “undesirable domination” in the region. [18]

It is obvious that as President Medvedev pointed out in his so called “five bullet points” doctrine, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests, regions that are home to countries with which Russia shares special historical relations and is bound together as friends and good neighbors.[18]


The Madrid Principles




On 10 July 2009 a Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was issued by the Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group’s co-chair countries France, the Russian Federation, and the United States at the “L’Aquila Summit of the Eight”in Italy. [16]

Along with this document, on the same day, a preliminary version of the Basic Principles for a Settlement to Armenia and Azerbaijan in November 2007 in Madrid (the so called “Madrid principles”) presented by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the U.S., France, and Russia were made public.[16]

The Basic Principles reflect a reasonable compromise based on the Helsinki Final Act principles of Non-Use of Force, Territorial Integrity, Equal Rights and Self-Determination of Peoples.[16]


These principles stipulate a return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control, an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance, a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh; future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno- Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will; the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their former places of residence; and international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation.[19]


Dr. Golshan Pashayeva:‘Double standards’ behind failure to resolve Karabakh conflict.[20]


October 4, 2012





Any actions in Azerbaijan’s occupied territories are illegal and have a negative impact on the negotiation process on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement, spokesman for the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry Elman Abdullayev told media today. [21]

He was commenting on the information of commissioning the airport in Khankendi earlier spread by Armenian media.[21]

“The international community must express its position on the issue,” he said. “The international community must also focus on Armenia’s illegal actions.”[21]

“Armenia’s actions, that is, opening the airport in Khankendi contradicts the international conventions, in particular the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation,” Abdullayev said.[21]

“The international community must not ignore the fact, directed against Azerbaijan’s sovereignty,” he said.[21]

“Armenia’s actions, that is, opening the airport in Khankendi contradicts the international conventions, in particular the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation,” Abdullayev said.[21]

“The international community must not ignore the fact, directed against Azerbaijan’s sovereignty,” he said.[21]

“Armenia is trying by all means to maintain the status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. OSCE, UN and other international organizations must also voice their opinion and force Armenia to liberate Azerbaijan’s territory for regional peace to be restored,” Abdullayev said. He was commenting on Armenian Foreign Minister’s statement made at the UN General Assembly.[21]

Commissioning of an airport in Khankendi is an open violation of the Convention on International Civil Aviation [signed in Chicago on Dec.7, 1944], Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov said earlier.[21]

Therefore, Azerbaijan will intensify work in legal sphere on applying the Chicago Convention, Azimov said.[21]

Azerbaijan has banned the use of the airspace of Nagorno-Karabakh occupied by Armenia, as no one can guarantee flight safety in the area, the head of the Azerbaijani Civil Aviation Administration, Arif Mammadov, told the New Azerbaijan party’s official website earlier.[21]

He said Armenia’s steps directed to the operation of the airport in Khankendi are attempts to violate international legal norms. This air space belongs to Azerbaijan, so its use by Armenia is impossible.[21]

The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the European Civil Aviation Conference (ICAC) also support the position of Azerbaijan on this issue.[21]

President Serzh Sargsyan promised to be the first passenger which will fly from Khankendi. The conflict between the two South Caucasus countries began in 1988 when Armenia made territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Armenian armed forces have occupied 20 per cent of Azerbaijan since 1992, including the Nagorno-Karabakh region and seven surrounding districts.[21]

Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a ceasefire agreement in 1994. The co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group – Russia, France and the U.S. – are currently holding peace negotiations.[21]

Armenia has not yet implemented the U.N. Security Council’s four resolutions on the liberation of the Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding regions.[21]



Dealing with the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the OSCE Minsk Group, which was created after the meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Helsinki on 24 March 1992. The Group’s members include Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, the United States, France, Italy, Germany, Turkey, Belarus, Finland and Sweden.[22]

Besides, the OSCE Minsk Group has a co-chairmanship institution, comprised of Russian, US and French co-chairs, which began operating in 1996. [22] Resolutions 822, 853, 874 and 884 of the UN Security Council, which were passed in short intervals in 1993, and other resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly, PACE, OSCE, OIC, and other organizations require Armenia to unconditionally withdraw its troops from Nagorno-Karabakh.[22]




Conflict in the South Caucasus:
Regional and International Contexts





































































































































































































































[1]http://www.fletchersecurity.org/
#!petersen/c1aiy

[2]http://www.esisc.org/
upload/publications/analyses/
the-armenian-iran-relationship/
Armenian-Iran%20relationship.pdf

[3]Iran Opposes Any U.S. Peacekeeping Role
For Karabakh”,Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

[4]http://www.rferl.org/content/
Iran_Against_Any_US_Peacekeeping
_Role_For_Karabakh/2081078.html

[5]Congressional Research Service, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments
and Implications (RL33453; Jun. 15, 2012),
by Jim Nichol, Federation of American Scientists,


[6]http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33453.pdf

[7]Dave Stebbins, Nicholas Cavellero,
Courtney Gates et al., Defense Institution
Building in the Caucasus to Promote Regional
Stability, Columbia School of International
and Public Affairs for the RAND corporation, p.


[8]http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/academics/
workshops/documents/
FORPUBLICATION_RANDCorp_Report.pdf
[Last accessed: September 3, 2012]


[9]https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/
russias-evolving-role-caucasus

[10]http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/
the-caucasus-the-next-battleground-for
-russia-and-turkey.aspx?pageID=449&
amp;nID=95808&NewsCatID=570

[11]http://www.biochemistry.ucla.edu/
biochem/Faculty/SClarke/pdf2/263.pdf

[12]http://theconversation.com/
the-neurochemistry-of-power-has
-implications-for-political-change-23844

[13]http://www.lse.ac.uk/sociology/pdf/
rose-theneurochemicalselfanditsanomaliesoct01.pdf

[14]http://www.eurasianet.org/node/79251

[15]http://www.jamestown.org/programs/
edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45390&
amp;cHash=466c954b087e7805e12f55d8a4fd2cb6#.V2hGSGfwuM8

[16]http://turkishpolicy.com/Files/ArticlePDF/
the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-in-the-aftermath-of
-the-russia-georgia-war-winter-2009-en.pdf


[17]Ambassador Araz Azimov. “Armenia-Azerbaijan
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Historical Background,
Legal Aspects and Negotiation Process,” in Azerbaijan
in Global Politics Crafting Foreign Policy (Baku,
Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, 2009), p. 283.

[18]Oleksandr Sushko, The End of ‘International Order
– 1991’: Impact of 2008 Russia-Georgia War,
on Ukraine (Warsaw, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2008),
p. 3.


[19]The White House Press Office “Joint Statement
on the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict,” 10 July 2009.

[20]http://karabakh.org/news/
double-standards-behind-failure-to-resolve-karabakh-conflict/

[21]http://karabakh.org/news/
foreign-ministry-any-actions-in-azerbaijans
-occupied-territories-are-illegal/

[22]http://en.apa.az/nagorno_karabakh/
jagland-council-of-europe-doesn-t-deal
-with-karabakh-conflict-settlement.html

[23]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_Agarunov

[24] (Russian) Jabrayilli, G. He Gave
His Life for His Homeland, Golos Karabakha.
Retrieved 22 May 2007.

[25]http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/
a-jewish-warrior-in-a-muslim-land/